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abstract This article discusses the idea of a ‘cultural public sphere’
together with related notions of ‘the’ public sphere, ‘counterpublics’ and
‘discourse publics’. It argues that the cultural public sphere emerges from
cultural sources (e.g. ethnic identity) rather than political ones and is
organized through private pursuits such as music, domestic life and leisure or
entertainment venues. The article investigates the formation of a cultural
public sphere by using the December 2005 ‘race riots’ on Australian beaches
as a case study. It argues that culture interacts with politics as ‘new’ media
interact with mainstream news; and that counterpublic spheres interact with
the cultural public sphere as ‘internal’ communication coexists with
‘external’. The role of mainstream media in reporting and commenting on
extreme displays is in part to stage conflict so that the general public can
think through cultural-political issues via the theatrics.
keywords Australian cultural studies, counterpublics, Cronulla, cultural
public sphere, Denmark, discourse publics, racial conflict, the beach
Staging cultural conflict
On a hot Saturday in December 2005, Cronulla Beach, part of the Suther-
land Shire just south of Sydney, erupted into what appeared to be race-
fuelled violence. National and international media were shocked by racist
slogans, angry faces and the bashing of youths of ‘Middle-Eastern appear-
ance’ by Anglo-Celtic ‘locals’ who had gathered on the beach. Australia’s
treasured leisure domain had become a site of political action. Cronulla
Beach had become a site for the ‘cultural public sphere’, a place where the
politics of the private realm are brought into the glare of the political
public sphere. The Cronulla riot provides a case study to think through the
formation of such a cultural public sphere, a site that exists in opposition
to ‘the’ public sphere, the place for political debate. Displayed via private
Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks ca
and New Delhi
Vol 9(3) 341–362; 1367-5494
DOI: 10.1177/1367549406066077
www.sagepublications.com 
a rt i c l e
e u ro p e a n  j o u r n a l  o f
06_066077_Hartley (JB-D)  26/6/06  1:34 pm  Page 341
pursuits such as music, sport, domestic life and leisure or entertainment
venues, including – particularly in Australia – the beach, the cultural
public sphere develops more or less out of sight of ‘the’ public sphere, and
its ‘citizens’ communicate using media that are equally invisible to the
mainstream. Its occasional but spectacular eruption into view of the news
media and the political public sphere points to the ways in which culture
interacts with politics, and ‘new’ media interact with mainstream news.
The mainstream media report and comment on these extreme displays
almost to the point of staging them. The theatrics serve to represent
conflicts within a given cultural domain via the most extreme examples –
in this case, racial tensions in suburban Sydney were explored by coverage
of racist violence. Such coverage functions at least in part to assist the
‘missing middle’ of politics, i.e. the general public who actually live
everyday life and the culture of the ordinary (which, by definition, remain
unnewsworthy), and to think through issues that are normally beyond the
pale of rational public debate but are generated within the experience of
identity and culture.
The cultural public sphere
If there is a cultural public sphere then it may need to be distinguished from
‘the’ public sphere. The public sphere in Habermas (1989[1962]) or Richard
Sennett (1977) is something akin to a political ‘reading public’, devoted to
engagement with journalism, current affairs and occasionally face-to-face
criticism of government or establishment actions (Hartley, 1996; Hartley
and McKee, 2000). By contrast, the cultural sphere invokes the realm of
private life and leisure pursuits (Gray, 2006, ch. 4). But as it has been noted
often, this distinction only holds as a kind of principle. In practice, the private
world of culture gives rise to its own forms of politics – not decision-maker
politics and the state, but identity politics and social movements.
According to Alan McKee (2005: 21), minority groups united by identity
politics now demand ‘the right to have . . . their own distinctive cultures
recognized within the public sphere’. Cunningham lists such distinctive
cultures as feminist and gay counterpublics, ethnic diasporas and ‘inter-
national public sphericules constituted around environmental or human
rights issues’ (2001: 133–4; see Cunningham and Sinclair, 2001). Such
communities are bound together by personal, private and cultural
attributes and affinities, not by their co-subjectivity in ‘the’ public sphere
as traditionally understood. In 2006, the year marked by the death of Betty
Friedan, it may be well to remember how the irruption of feminism into
the political process in the 1960s seemed literally outlandish, to both main-
stream political players and political ‘science’. Successive irruptions of the
cultural and personal into the public and political have characterized
western politics from then to now; and still there is a sense that some
fundamental dualism is being breached. So a concept such as the cultural342
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public sphere may be useful because it holds these apparent opposites
together, allowing consideration of the political dimension of cultural life
(see Figure 1, top).
This model of a cultural public sphere is not new. Recently, Jim
McGuigan (2005) has posited a similar model, noting that the potential for
a cultural public sphere is contained within Habermas’ own original formu-
lation, which distinguished between the political public sphere and the
literary public sphere. While the former was constrained by journalism, the
latter was not, and McGuigan proposes an expansion of the literary public
sphere into a cultural public sphere that includes a range of media and
popular culture. Hartley’s discussion of the increasing importance of ‘jour-
nalism of the private sphere’ (1996: 145) proposes a similar potential for a
counterpart to the political public sphere based on cultural politics. The
same notion is contained in Rita Felski’s proposal of a feminist counterpub-
lic sphere formulated around an ‘affirmation of specificity in relation to
gender, race, ethnicity, age, sexual preference’ (1989: 166).
Irruptions of the cultural (identity) into the political can come from both
extremes of politics, Left and Right. On the Left, ‘counterpublics’ are identi-
fied generally with left-wing activism such as environmental, ethnic, gender,
peace and youth movements. Examples include the protests at the 1999
Seattle and 2005 Hong Kong meetings of the World Trade Organization, and
also those that follow the World Economic Forum. The Seattle protests took
organizers by surprise, with conservative estimates putting the numbers at
40,000; this is thought to be the ‘coming out’ of the anti-globalization
movement.1 José Bové became a countercultural superstar after he disman-
tled a McDonald’s restaurant in France in 2001. An Australian example
would be the mobilization of ‘techno-circus’ and protest theatre by the ‘feral’
movement. Drawing on ‘do-it-yourself’ (DIY) traditions inspired by UK
techno sound system development, ‘the social aesthetic of the dance party’
is mobilized to intervene in and expose ‘the affairs of state and capital’, a
tactical intervention whereby ‘a range of media is employed to rupture
existing sites, institutions and corporations, to create an opening to hetero-
geneity, to generate dialogue with others, to “make a difference” and to
subvert the proper places of power’ (St John, 2005: 7).
Few commentators extend the notion of the ‘counterpublic sphere’ to
right-wing activism. However, cultural identity can lead to political
expression at either extreme of politics. For example, ethnic identity can
fuel racial supremacism and, in turn, that ‘counterpublic sphere’ uses
cultural pursuits such as music to call together its own ‘discourse public’,
such as the neo-Nazi music movement embodied by Nazi rock, Nazi punk
and what the online encyclopaedia Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org) refers
to as ‘National Socialist black metal’. Right-wing and white power music
culture provides an ongoing rallying point for the expression of particular
‘countercultural’ politics. This culture gives rise to protest in the form of
the Rock against Communism concerts in the UK in the 1980s which in 343
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turn spawned the ‘Blood & Honour’ white power networks (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Socialist_black_metal; http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rock_Against_Communism; http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Blood_and_Honour). More recently, in 2004, 12-year-old twin
sisters Lamb and Lynx Gaede from California caused a stir when they
were launched as ‘white pride’ band Prussian Blue, who ‘hope to help
fellow Whites come to understand that love for one’s race is a beautiful
gift that we should celebrate’ (see www.prussianblue.net/bio.htm).2
McGuigan points out that cultural politics and the politicization of art
figured prominently in the Nazi campaign in 1930s Germany. He points
particularly to the ‘degeneration’ of Leftist art by the Nazis and the belief
that ‘Germany had the right to appropriate and possess the great European
heritage of art, since the Third Reich represented the pinnacle of civilis-
ation’ (McGuigan, 2005: 430–1).
Not surprisingly then, the ultra-nationalist Australia First Party and
Patriotic Youth League tried to co-opt the Cronulla riots as a platform to
spread their political agenda. Just as they turn up at football grounds, rock
concerts and to national memorial events such as Anzac Day, so they saw
the beach – and the ‘discourse public’ gathered there – as their territory.
Mainstream news played up their presence in the immediate aftermath,
but later on began to distinguish these activists from the ordinary
Australians in the crowd (ABC News Online, 2006; Carter, 2006).
Communication and the cultural public sphere
Under the radar of news media – precisely the opposite of newsworthy –
can be found routine, ordinary, locality-based everyday life, within which
self-representing communities may develop. Such communities may be
mainstream and fully integrated (e.g. communities of interest around
sport, arts and crafts, music) or excluded and marginal. The latter may
include ethnic and religious activism (neo-Nazis, Islamist organizations),
culture-jamming (from anti-globalization to animal liberation), as well as
subcultures and youth cultures. In addition, of course, they may overlap,
as is notoriously the case with sport, racism and music. Such communities
of interest tend to develop more or less out of sight of ‘the’ public sphere,
often using forms of communication that are equally invisible to the main-
stream media. But occasionally they burst into spectacular public visibil-
ity, sometimes to the great surprise of those, including politicians and
columnists, whose attention is routinely held by ‘the’ public sphere and
mainstream political communication. On such occasions a cultural public
sphere comes into being.
Rita Felski (1989) has written of a ‘feminist public sphere’ which runs
counter to ‘the’ public sphere. In a counterpublic sphere a subordinated
social group can invent and circulate discourses that resonate with their
own status, interests and needs. Such counterpublic spheres deliver both344
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‘internal’ and ‘external’ communication. They allow the ‘citizens’ of the
counterpublic to come together and speak to each other (e.g. via specialist
magazines addressed to ‘co-subjects’), while other forms broadcast the
group’s political agenda back to the public sphere from which they feel
excluded (e.g. via ‘consciousness raising’).
Counterpublic spheres are multiple and heterogeneous, and they articu-
late alternative or oppositional values to those held by the public sphere.
Thus, within the counterpublics that they represent they appeal to the
same sense of universality as the Habermasian public sphere. For ‘external’
communication they tend to use a directly political and ‘rational’ or news-
oriented media. Activist organizations such as Greenpeace seek to provoke
mainstream media coverage, and so in practice a considerable element of
countercultural activism is theatrical and spectacular (irrational theatrics
for rational causes). But whether it comes from the Left (feminism) or the
Right (Prussian Blue) it does not amount to a cultural public sphere until
it intersects with society-wide media and culture – at which point, a
cultural public sphere may be formed. So, it may be argued that the
counterpublic sphere is to the cultural public sphere as internal com-
munication is to external communication. But what is important about
external communication in this case is that it is not controlled by the
countercultural group itself, but erupts in a mainstream media over which
none of the participants has control. There it ‘represents’ cultural
identities, values and conflicts that are present in the mainstream but are
not counted as political in ‘the’ public sphere.
Discourse publics
Michael Warner (2002) identifies the participants within ‘the’ (Haber-
masian) public sphere as self-organized, discursive agents using a form of
address that creates relations among strangers. This helpfully describes
the communicative function of the cultural public sphere. He argues
that publics are created by ‘the social space created by the reflexive
circulation of discourse’ formed by the ‘concatenation of texts through
time’ (2002: 62). As such, central to the historical formation of the
public in modern Europe (and in Europe’s plantation societies) was
the appearance of newsletters and other temporally structured forms oriented
to their own circulation: not just controversial pamphlets, but regular and
dated papers, magazines, almanacs, annuals, and essay serials. They developed
reflexivity about their circulation through reviews, reprintings, citation,
controversy. These forms single out circulation both through their sense of
temporality and through the way they allow discourse to move in different
directions. I don’t speak just to you; I speak to the public in a way that enters
a cross-citational field of many other people speaking to the public. (Warner,
2002: 66) 345
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For Warner, discourse is crucial to the very existence of the public:
A public is a space of discourse organized by nothing other than discourse itself.
It is autotelic; it exists only as the end for which books are published, shows
broadcast, Web sites posted, speeches delivered, opinions produced. It exists by
virtue of being addressed. (2002: 50, emphasis in original)
Here, Warner is describing a reading public – which one of us has
identified also as the historic basis for the public sphere (Hartley, 1996;
Hartley and McKee, 2000). However, Warner updates the notion of
‘reading’ by identifying what he calls a ‘discourse public’ – although it is
not a familiar or felicitous term, it is more accurate because it encompasses
all forms of communication, not just writing. And whereas the term
‘reading’ has attracted some normative evaluative baggage in the era of
print literacy, the idea of a discourse public supposes no hierarchy of media
platforms or formats in which discourse may be communicated properly,
from advertising to the Xbox.
Early modern nations were formed around the idea that the nation and
the reading public were one and the same thing, and that both were inde-
pendent of the state or government. But to make any such assumption is
increasingly unwise. Warner again:
The strangeness of this kind of public [one formed around texts, even adver-
tising or the ‘chattering of a DJ’] is often hidden from view because the
assumptions that enable the bourgeois public sphere allow us to think of a
discourse public as a people and, therefore, as an actually existing set of poten-
tially enumerable humans. A public, in practice, appears as the public. It is easy
to be misled by this appearance. Even in the blurred usage of the public sphere,
a public is never just a congeries of people, never just the sum of persons who
happen to exist. It must first of all have some way of organizing itself as a
body and of being addressed in discourse. And not just any way of defining
the totality will do. It must be organized by something other than the state . . .
A public organizes itself independently of state institutions, law, formal frame-
works of citizenship, or pre-existing institutions such as the church. (2002: 51;
emphasis in original)
This independence is necessary for the public to be free from state
control and thus be able to fulfil the democratic role of citizens who are
(in principle) sovereign over the state.
Warner’s description of publics seems helpful still further because of
the thin distinction that he draws between publics and counterpublics.
Despite the asserted oppositional stance of the latter, they are formed
through the production of discourse such as the former. But the very
conditions that enable a discourse public to emerge also ensure that there
will never be just one of them. Indeed, ‘the’ public sphere is a convenient346
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fantasy, for discourse publics form around many different nodes, differen-
tiated by language, culture, locality, etc. At best there are many ‘public
sphericules’ (Cunningham, 2001; Gitlin, 1998), some of which may
coalesce into a cluster that seems more or less unitary. But others will
barely intersect with ‘the’ public sphere or its discourses at all. The more
excluded, marginal or extreme that a given community of interest is, the
more likely that its ‘public sphericule’ will be invisible to others, although
it is only a click away on the internet.
Counterpublic spheres (or sphericules) are associated with communi-
cation channels and media that are invisible to mainstream news media.
Diasporic communities circulate videos from home or elsewhere in a
global network; individuals use email, the internet and even faxes and
photocopiers where the official media are state-controlled, as in late New
Order Indonesia and China post-Tiananmen Square. Historically, radical
movements have shown a persistent tendency to adopt the newest avail-
able media of communication, and to use them earlier and more imagina-
tively than mainstream media. A recent example is the Indymedia
network (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indymedia), formed in 1999 for
participants in the anti-globalization movement to report on the protests
against the Seattle World Trade Organization meeting.
Counterpublic spheres are not the same as the cultural public sphere,
but the latter, when sparked into existence by circumstances, is character-
ized similarly by informal modes of communication. Where it exists, the
cultural public sphere comprises a discourse public gathered by means of
non-canonical media in places far away from politics (whether mainstream
or counter).
The beach
The beach occupies an important and multivalent place in Australia itself
and also in Australian cultural studies. The Australian Journal of Cultural
Studies (1983–7) – which later became the American-edited, London-
published Cultural Studies – nominated the beach as a ‘cultural motif ’
(along with the barbeque) in its opening description of the aims and scope
of the journal. The beach fascinated John Fiske, who marked his own
arrival in Australia with an analysis of Perth’s Cottesloe beach, in ‘Surfal-
ism and Sandiotics’ (Fiske, 1983). The odd title, an homage-parody of
Terence Hawkes’ influential Structuralism and Semiotics (1977), was
meant to demonstrate that sand and surf could be ‘read like a text’. Later,
in collaboration with Bob Hodge and Graeme Turner, Fiske produced a
book that sought to include the beach as part of ‘Australian mythology’:
The beach’s centrality to the culture is won by its appropriation of those
attitudes most closely related to an Australian mythology while placing itself
in opposition to those that are excluded . . . [W]hile drawing so heavily on the 347
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natural, it manages to fit so seamlessly into its urban context (culture) without
losing its potential for its primary meaning (nature). (Fiske et al., 1987: 54)
‘The beach’ most often imagined in Australia tends to be urban – Bondi,
Cottesloe, St Kilda, Glenelg – as opposed to the remote beaches beloved of
hardcore surfers and tourist brochures but rarely visited by the general
public, prompting Fiske and his colleagues to pursue a city/ocean,
culture/nature opposition to explore its importance in the imagination of
Australia. The interplay of culture and nature is an important myth-
generating mechanism to address the plight of contemporary Australian
existence. Fiske and colleagues (1987) connect the rising importance of the
beach in Australian culture to the rise of urbanization, which made redun-
dant older myths of the bush, the bush ranger (symbolized by Ned Kelly)
and an isolated hideaway. Instead, suburban-dwelling Australians brought
nature into culture and vice versa, by means of the beach. The character-
istically Australian beach is:
urban and natural, civilised and primitive, spiritual and physical, culture and
nature. The meaning of any one beach is a particular example of this
paradigm, as either culture or nature is subordinated in favour of its opposite.
(Fiske et al., 1987: 55; emphasis added)
However, Meaghan Morris (1992, 1998) points out that ‘the’ beach in
Australian culture (and cultural studies) is not representative of national
identity so much as of nationalism. It is mobilized as a site of foundation
myths for Anglo-Australia, either celebratory (in the case of Horne’s The
Lucky Country; 1964), or critical (as found in a poem by John Forbes;
1988). For Morris, the idea of the beach as a founding myth of ‘Australian
Ordinariness’ is itself devoid of self-reflexivity, either about the historical
location of the images constructed or of their white, male and totalizing
exclusivity. Simultaneously, she identifies the beach as an often-
compelling object utilized by Australian cultural studies to develop its
project (Morris, 1992), full of excess signification for Australian cultural
studies to reveal. Problematizing it as a site where national myths are
written and discussed, Morris locates the beach as one where anxieties
about national culture and the Antipodean experience are explored.
The 2000 conference of the Cultural Studies Association of Australia
(CSAA) took up the challenge of this theme. Titled ‘On the Beach’ (in
contradistinction to the 1997 CSAA conference, which had gone ‘In Search
of the Public’), it called for papers about this ‘quintessential Australian
icon’, ‘Australianness’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘the end of the world’ (referencing
Nevil Shute’s novel On the Beach (1966[1957]; but see Nairn, 2005),
Stanley Kramer’s 1959 film of the book and a subsequent TV mini-
series). Centring on images, ideas and utilizations of the beach, the
conference invited papers about Australian texts (Puberty Blues (1981),348
e u ro p e a n  j o u r n a l  o f  c u lt u r a l  st u d i e s  9 ( 3 )
06_066077_Hartley (JB-D)  26/6/06  1:34 pm  Page 348
surf magazines), pastimes (surfing or tanning), the body and Australian
cultural studies. Not surprisingly, the beach was found to be a ‘privileged
site’ for the exploration of Australian national identity (Bonner et al., 2001:
270). Traditionally, Australian identity had been located in the ‘red centre’
and the bush, which have enjoyed the status of being an ‘authentic,
timeless, pristine and past’ site for considering the ‘grand narratives’ of
Australian national identity. By contrast, Bonner et al. (2001) present the
beach as ‘more ordinary, everyday, tacky, familiar, mixed’. The beach is:
an important site for thinking about Australia: as a privileged metaphor for
thinking about our nation; as a site where gender identities can be worked out
– either unclothed and ordinary, or clothed and attempting to reject a relation-
ship with the United Kingdom . . . an image of Australia which is not counter-
cultural, but proudly mainstream and proudly feminized. (Bonner et al., 2001:
273)
Taking a cue from Meaghan Morris (1992, 1998), Mark Gibson (2001)
remarks on the Anglo-whiteness of Australian beaches. Whiteness is often
central to the ‘semiotic cluster’ that represents Australian beaches as the
antithesis of English ordinariness. Gibson notes that Morris presents the
Australian beach as a place of constancy:
In the discourse of Australian ordinariness, the significance of the beach is not
as a site of escape but, on the contrary, of a certain inertia; it is a place where
things can be trusted to endure. (Gibson, 2001: 282; emphasis in original)
Cultural studies has never really given up on the beach, which has
proven to be a machine for thinking about identity, the body, desire and
nation. Such topics were well suited to the ‘politics of pleasure’ phase of
cultural studies, but locating them on the beach had the effect of casting
that site as ‘cultural’ in the sense of ‘not political’ as well as ‘not natural’.
As an interzone between nature and culture, as in Fiske et al.’s (1987)
surf/beach/road/city continuum, straightforward political actions and
meanings were not sought on the beach – it was a ‘cultural motif ’, not a
political hotspot. It may have displayed signs of a very partial and ethno-
centric mythic imaginary, but it was not understood as part of the public
sphere (which in any case has remained a contested term in cultural
studies: see Cunningham, 2001; Gray, 2006).
Australia turns ugly
So far we have argued that a cultural public sphere, representing an inter-
zone between culture and politics, calls together a discourse public (not a
counterpublic sphere), often by novel means of communication, to express
values and identities that are not found generally in the public sphere of 349
h a rt l e y  a n d  g r e e n : t h e  p u b l i c  s p h e r e  o n  t h e  b e a c h
06_066077_Hartley (JB-D)  26/6/06  1:34 pm  Page 349
rational debate about the real. We have shown that ‘the beach’ holds a
special place in the Australian imaginary, both popularly and intellectu-
ally. This is why one of them suddenly became newsworthy around the
world for all the wrong reasons. As the London Observer noted:
It is supposed to be the lucky country, where the beach culture more than any
other phenomenon symbolises all that is breezy, open and inclusive about
Australia. But the cocktail of fear, alienation and youthful anger spawned by
the worst racial violence ever seen here now threatens the traditional Christ-
mas of sun, sand and surf . . . The civil unrest gripping Australia’s biggest city
began two weeks ago after two teenage lifeguards at North Cronulla Beach, in
south Sydney, were attacked by a Lebanese Australian gang. There had been
anecdotes of sporadic violence and intimidation at Cronulla by groups of
Lebanese Australians over several years, but this attack on the lifeguards, the
most iconic of Australian symbols, went too far for many people. (O’Riordan,
2005a)3
One British newspaper said that ‘Australia was last night in the grip of
its worst race clashes since independence’. The BBC reported that it was
among Australia’s ‘worst racial violence in history’ (BBC News, 2005;
O’Riordan, 2005b). The contrast could be hardly more stark, or more
mythical. Here was a story of The Fall; the instant transformation from
‘sacred’ paradise to profane vale of tears. Let the New York Times mark
the change, from this:
Because 90 percent of Australia’s population lives within 30 miles of the coast-
line the beach is the hub of the nation’s culture. To visit Sydney’s beaches, or
any beach in Australia, is to step onto sacred ground. It is where the people go
to worship the sun and sea, to satiate their thirst for hedonism and to shed the
trappings of everyday life. At Bondi Beach, on the city side of the harbor,
lawyers and business people spread their towels beside tattooed laborers. At
Cronulla, farther south, bare-breasted women sun themselves beside children
in floppy hats. (Kovacs, 1989)
To this:
Thousands of drunken white youths attacked people they believed were of
Arab descent at a beach outside Sydney on Sunday in one of Australia’s worst
outbursts of ethnic violence. The attack [was] apparently prompted by
reports that Lebanese youths had assaulted two lifeguards. (New York Times,
2005)
In the Brisbane Courier-Mail, Matthew Condon likened the rioters to
that 1970s icon of larrikin Aussie identity, Barry McKenzie (the fictional
character in films by Bruce Beresford and Barry Humphries). Something350
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that had been lurking inside ‘Australian Ordinariness’ for decades turned
‘evil’ and political at once:
Barry McKenzie was there at the Cronulla riots late last year, swilling beer and
shouting his ‘Australianness’ in that distinctive national twang of ours. He was
there in the mindless, drunken mobs that reeled around Sydney’s beachside
suburbs looking for ‘non-Australian’ victims. Each summer and winter the
new, evil Barry is in the grandstands watching football and cricket, hurling
racist slurs from the fence line. (Condon, 2006; see also Moore, 2005)
From the start, everyone knew what it was about. The Australian
painted Cronulla as ‘a white, Anglo-Celtic, Christian heartland’, a ‘white
sanctuary’, ominously ‘hemmed in by the great Middle Eastern melting
pots of Sydney: suburbs such as Bankstown, where half the residents are
from non-English-speaking backgrounds’ (Overington and Warne-Smith,
2005: 17). Cronulla Beach is the meeting point where groups of men from
these differing backgrounds ultimately face each other, skin to skin. Media
around the world were quick to sense the significance of the ‘biffo’ that
ensued.
Conflict and the beach
As a settler society that has experienced successive waves of immigration,
Australia is no stranger to intercommunal violence based on race; for
example those ‘targeting Chinese on the goldfields in the 19th century and
Italian and Slav workers in Western Australia in the 1930s’ (Inglis, 2006),
alongside a much longer history of settler or Indigenous violence. The
irruption of ‘culture’ into ‘politics’ via liminal leisure destinations such as
the beach also has antecedents, for example mods versus rockers in Britain
and the Bodgies and Widgies in Australia in the 1960s (Stratton, 1992).
The ‘ugly’ side to Australia’s much-vaunted egalitarian ‘mateship’ culture
has long been acknowledged also (Hornadge, 1975; see also Moore, 2005).
The Cronulla rioting brought a new political dimension to an old story.
It was not a ‘riot’ in the usual sense; it was not directed against establish-
ment institutions or state forces. It was straightforward communal
violence, featuring mutual attacks by ‘Anglo-Celtic’ (white) and ‘Lebanese’
groups (the latter extended to anyone ‘looking Middle-Eastern’, or people
who appeared to be Muslims). But this conflict had little to do with the
traditional cause of interracial strife, namely economic competition
among ‘have-nots’ for resources such as land or jobs. It would be wrong to
discount an economic motive underlying any ‘white trash’ racism; recall,
for example, the Hansonite line:
You know how they say ‘The rich are getting richer, and the poor are getting
poorer.’ They forgot to add that the rich are becoming Asian, and the poor are
becoming Australian. (quoted in Hage, 1998: 215) 351
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However, this was not the main issue at Cronulla, which was all about
identity – a fight about different ways of being Australian:
In contrast [to confrontations based on competition for land or labour], as the
use of the Australian flag, the national anthem, and rioters’ appeals to other
national icons and the Australian way of life indicate, the contemporary chal-
lenge involves ownership and access to membership in the nation and its culture.
(Inglis, 2006; emphasis added)
What was at stake in the confrontation was culture – the use of the
beach and the right way to ‘be’ Australian. The lead up to the 11 December
2005 riot was marked by reports about cultural use and misuse of the beach
at Cronulla. An attack on two North Cronulla lifeguards on patrol on 4
December was identified widely as the immediate catalyst for the violence
(Overington and Warne-Smith, 2005). While it was reported that they
were attacked by four men in what may not have been an unprovoked
event (AAP Australian National News Wire, 2005a; Lawrence, 2005), it
was editorialized by the Daily Telegraph (2005) as ‘an attack on us all’. A
spokesman for Surf Life Saving Sydney described the attack as part of
ongoing antagonism between lifeguards and ‘gangs’ of youths who regu-
larly came from outside of the community to have a good time by engaging
in what is ‘by community standards . . . nothing more than harassment and
intimidation’ (Ravens, 2005).
Seen as an attack on an Australian icon and tradition,4 the assault on
these lifeguards challenged the ‘white’ way of using the beach. Labelling
the incoming groups ‘Arabs’, a chronology of the events leading up to the
riot in The Australian details the breaches of beach culture reported to
have upset the locals:
[Cronulla locals] allege the men taunt the lifesavers by stealing equipment and
kicking balls at them. They annoy other beachgoers by claiming large sections
of sand, from the water to the beach stairs, as a football pitch. They force
people who are sunbaking to move by kicking up sand around them. They park
illegally, blocking people’s driveways, and tread all over people’s towels. Or so
it is alleged by local officials and beachgoers. (Overington and Warne-Smith,
2005: 17)
The Australian’s editorial also reports ‘seething resentment’ at the treat-
ment of young girls who are ‘harassed, ogled, leered and whistled at while
they sunbake’. Once disturbed, these girls, ‘especially young girls, of
Anglo-Saxon appearance’, report Middle-Eastern youths making
‘appalling suggestions about how they might pass the time on the beach,
offering to have sex with the girls and asking if they are virgins’. The
Daily Telegraph claimed that the presence of such gangs ‘turn Cronulla
Beach into a war zone’ (McIlveen, 2005a). After a week of simmering352
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tensions, the beach was set for an act of ‘reclamation’. On 11 December
2005, 5000 white people gathered at Cronulla Beach, many of whom were
drunk, draped in Australian flags, some with racist slogans painted on their
skin and some singing ‘Waltzing Matilda’ maliciously (Pearlman et al.,
2005). They were said to have been called to the beach by means of racially
antagonistic mobile phone SMS (text) messages and emails. The rally
turned violent in the afternoon when the mob beat up a number of
Middle-Eastern Australians who were unlucky enough to be there.
Two days later, in the wake of the violence, up to 100 Middle-Eastern
youths drove to a neighbouring suburb and damaged 60 cars in retali-
ation (Sunday Times, 2005). The police cracked down on the area,
stopping and searching cars, confiscating weapons and making some
arrests. The next day, 16 youths were charged. Their release on bail
caused more disappointment and anger in the community. On 14
December 2005, a Catholic primary school was sprayed with gunfire and
two church buildings were vandalized. Racist text messages inciting
retaliation were intercepted in other states including Western Australia
and Queensland.
The mainstream media wade in
The riot was contextualized in the media as an escalation of simmering
tensions. The background causes named included the attacks on the US on
11 September 2001, the Tampa incident (during an ‘illegal immigrant’
crackdown by the Australian government) and gang rapes by ‘Lebanese’
gangs in south-west Sydney between 2000 and 2002. An unsuccessful high
court appeal by the perpetrators of the most brutal of these had featured
prominently in the media in the weeks leading up to the Cronulla riots. It
was cited by commentators as one of the contributing causes, even though
the convicted perpetrators were not Lebanese. An ABC-TV Four Corners
report shown in the wake of the sentencing for these crimes attributed the
intense scrutiny of Australia’s Lebanese and Arab communities, particu-
larly their young men, to ‘anti-Muslim backlash from September 11 and
the refugee debate’ (McDonell, 2002).
The Cronulla riot seems to be further evidence of what Graeme Turner
has identified as ‘the completion of the conservative redefinition’ (2003:
413) of Australia’s imagined community. Turner argues that the repeated
moral panic against Lebanese and Muslim-Australians played out in the
Australian press, across talk radio and in some government policies, works
consistently to deny Muslim-Australians membership in the Australian
community. Indeed, the slogan ‘I grew here, you flew here’, reportedly seen
painted on a rioter (Rintoul, 2006; Zreika, 2006), aggressive singing of
‘traditionally Australian’ songs such as ‘Waltzing Matilda’, and passionate
displays of the Australian flag would seem to support Turner’s conclusion
that: 353
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Australia is now a community overwhelmingly defined by the necessity of
exclusion, and increasingly marked by the revival of a nostalgic, even
sentimental, refutation of the pluralism that informed the ethics of multi-
culturalism. (2003: 413)
In other words, the private domain of cultural identity has attained the
status of high politics – the cultural public sphere.
A ‘discourse public’ formed by SMS and talk radio
The Cronulla riots relied on a medium of communication that was
invisible to mainstream media attention. Calls for people from both sides
of the confrontation to assemble in particular places and times were passed
around via word of mouth and SMS (text) messaging (McIlveen, 2005b).
Racist texts on mobile phones were duly filmed for television news, but
The Age also stressed that an anti-racism campaign was organized via SMS
in response to text messages calling for support at the racist rally:
When Tim Longhurst read about a racist SMS campaign calling people to
Cronulla Beach last weekend, he decided to start his own campaign to promote
a more positive message about Sydney’s racial diversity. (Frew and Jackson,
2005: 4)
And although no ‘copycat’ incidents eventuated from the messages that
later appeared in Queensland and Western Australia, simply reporting
their appearance successfully raised the spectre of a cultural movement
taking place outside of channels controlled by ‘the’ public.
The police made a number of arrests in relation to the appearance
of videos on white supremacist websites such as Stormfront (www.
stormfront.org) celebrating the violence of the riots (AAP Australian
National News Wire, 2005b). An alleged white supremacist arrested on
weapons charges in the days following the riot was revealed to have set up
a website inciting continuation of the violence. Linking his counter-
cultural identity with new-media savvy, The Australian reported that he
had led another life as an ‘international cyber hacker . . . well known in
the cyber world’, who claimed to have developed a computer virus (Baker,
2005: 2). The paper revealed that although only 25, his offline identity was
better known in connection to bomb threats made against the offices of
the Australian Republican Movement in 1999.
The other important medium for disseminating the rallying cries of the
‘Australian’ rioters (as opposed to the Lebanese retaliators) was talk radio.
This form of mediation was once considered to be well beyond the limit
of the rational public sphere. However, it has become a favoured ‘antenna’
for politicians such as Australian prime minister John Howard to sample
and gauge public opinion. It has successfully conjoined a cultural and a354
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political discourse public within the Australian polity and elsewhere (see
Mickler, 1992). As Turner points out, ‘a new politics of identity has become
embedded in the Australian national imagery’ that invokes an ‘Australian
identity that is agreed, singular and established’, threatened by destruction
from ‘outside’ forces (Turner, 2003: 415). Turner identifies talk radio as a
site where such an identity is resoundingly rehearsed. It provides a more
stable location than the beach for these politics to be debated.
Radio ‘shock jocks’ such as Alan Jones and Steve Price leapt on the
content of the text messages, the community unrest and the disappoint-
ments that they voiced (see Nolan, 2005; Topsfield, 2005). In the Sydney
Morning Herald, David Marr described Jones as ‘screaming like a race
caller whose horse was coming home’, quoting him thus:
‘I’m the person that’s led this charge here. Nobody wanted to know about
North Cronulla, now it’s gathered to this.’ The riot was three days away and
Sydney’s top-rating breakfast host had heaps of anonymous emails to whip his
2GB listeners on. ‘Alan, it’s not just a few Middle Eastern bastards at the
weekend, it’s thousands. Cronulla is a very long beach and it’s been taken over
by this scum. It’s not a few causing trouble, it’s all of them’ . . . He assured his
audience he ‘understood’ why that famous text message went out and he read
it right through again on air: ‘Come to Cronulla this weekend to take revenge.
This Sunday every Aussie in the shire get down to North Cronulla to support
the leb and wog bashing day.’ Daily he cautioned his listeners not to take the
law into their own hands, but he warmed to those who had exactly that on
their minds. On Thursday Charlie rang to suggest all junior footballers in the
shire gather on the beach to support the lifesavers. ‘Good stuff, good stuff,’ said
Jones. (Marr, 2005)
‘Troublemakers’: vital characters in a staged drama
Conservative commentator Gerard Henderson blamed private communi-
cation in his opinion piece:
It is unfair to blame the mainstream media for what happened. For example,
a re-reading of Sydney’s Daily Telegraph indicates that it reported the lead-
up to last Sunday’s events quite responsibly. Likewise, talkback radio did not
spark the violence. Young Australians, of whatever ethnic background, can
communicate their messages by mobile phones without using the established
media. (Henderson, 2005)
Further, he attempts to remove the public from the frame by signalling
the events as a ‘police matter’ to be ‘resolved in the courts’:
It is especially serious because the crimes which took place have been moti-
vated by troublemakers, Anglo-Celtic members of the lunar right and alien-
ated cultural Muslims alike. (Henderson, 2005) 355
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‘Troublemakers’ are just what the mainstream media need, because the
representation of the ‘cultural’ sphere of identity within the political
public sphere requires a theatrical staging of conflict, which in turn needs
extremes – in this case the ‘lunar right’ and ‘alienated cultural Muslims’
alike. Their battles on the beach are not acceptable as ‘politics’ (which is
why they are characterized as ‘criminal’) but nevertheless they do express
deeper tensions within Australian culture. Evidently, the white, Anglo,
masculine ‘Australian Ordinariness’ that Morris identifies as a fiction
rather than a myth embodied by the beach, has been challenged by the
representational politics of Muslim-Australians. The Anglo-Australian in
the open-necked shirt is struggling to ‘endure’. These deeper tensions are
exactly the ones with which the political public sphere rarely deals. Prime
Minister Howard’s statement after the riots, that he did not believe there
was a racist undercurrent in Australia, demonstrates how hard it is for the
political public sphere to manage conflicts of identity and culture (Murphy
and Davies, 2005).
So too is the switch by the mainstream press from speaking as a bastion
of the outraged to becoming the champion of law and order. ‘Fight for
Cronulla – We want our beach back’ was the headline that the Daily Tele-
graph ran in the week leading up to the riot. While the accompanying
article reported on the ‘disgust’ at the lifeguard attacks felt by some
Sutherland Shire residents, none of these residents made a call to arms.
Rather, the beachgoers interviewed indicated they would rather go else-
where than deal with the trouble on Cronulla Beach (Lawrence, 2005).
After the violence, the paper ran a series of special sections featuring large
font headers declaring ‘Riots: Our Disgrace’ and ‘Riots: Stop the Violence’
(see Day, 2005). These articles detailed the lead-up to and aftermath of
the riot. Angered locals were transformed in a day into violent marauders.
Their transformation, where cultural politics comes to a head, remains out
of the public eye.
The cultural public sphere becomes the stage on which such tensions
can be fought out for the edification of the spectator in the general
community (see Cunningham, 2001). Thus ‘troublemakers’ are both
provoked (via new media and talk radio) and rebuked (via mainstream
media commentary). The role of the mainstream news in reporting and
commenting on these extreme displays is at least in part to assist those who
are caught in the middle – the public – to think through the issues via the
theatrics. The beach can be understood as a stage for the cultural public
sphere, where identity politics and matters of representation are drawn
from the private realm into the public (see Figure 1, middle).
356
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The beach goes to Denmark
The cultural public sphere does not have to be violent. Ugliness can be
tempered with romance. This happened on a beach near Melbourne barely
a month before the events at Cronulla. Veteran observer of nationalism
Tom Nairn was there:
On the beach . . . people halfway to emancipation are imagining the rest of the
journey, in their own way . . . Democracy is more resourceful than many of its
protagonists (and professors) have realised. (Nairn, 2005)
This reflection was provoked by the spectacle of a beach party (complete
with ‘Vikings’, flaming arrows shot into the sea, and plenty of ice-cold
357
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beer) to celebrate the birth of a son to Princess Mary, who is married to the
crown prince of Denmark but originates from Tasmania. Nairn thought
that the ‘surrogate enthusiasm for an alternative royal show’ (to Charles
and Camilla) betrayed an ‘essential impulse’ that has less to do with a love
of monarchy than with an Australian love of egalitarian friendliness. The
Windsors offer an ugly spectacle that is ‘too much like us’:
Pommy stodge, braying racist jokes, wearing hopelessly wrong things to fancy-
dress balls, Mum not turning up at her own son’s wedding, sneering intellec-
tuals and tabloid hysterics. No episode of Neighbours could be so awful. (Nairn,
2005)
The alternative is Australian commoner Mary Donaldson marrying a
friendly Dane called ‘Fred’, whom she met in a pub. As Nairn argues:
‘Australia is founded on an aspiring commoner mythology – something not
so easily realized politically’, but somehow an Australian princess ‘feels
curiously like a confirmation of “the fair go” and egalitarian mateship’
(Nairn, 2005). While no government would contemplate switching
allegiance from one royal house to another, it is a different matter for
Australians on the beach: ‘formality isn’t what this is about. What is it
about? Informal passion – elective democracy of the heart.’
But unfortunately, even the romance of informal ‘mateship’ and passion
has its ugly side. As Nairn points out (in reference to Neville Shute’s In the
Wet; 2000[1952]), ‘there was . . . a bit more to White Australia than most
now willingly recall’. Falling in love with foreign (Danish) royalty did not
extend to sharing the beach with migrant-looking (Lebanese) neighbours.
Actually, however, ugly and romantic egalitarianism are two sides of the
same coin: ‘passion’, ‘elective democracy of the heart’, ‘the fair go’ and
‘egalitarian mateship’ can result equally in sentimental backslapping over
a beer (Denmark) or an alcohol-fuelled ‘biffo’ (Cronulla), and both are
comfortable on the beach (see Figure 1, bottom). However, none of those
affective qualities are comfortable components of the rational public
sphere. Romantic ‘passion’ and racist ‘egalitarianism’ belong to Cronulla,
not Canberra. This is why they are almost invisible to the factual media
until something incandescent lights up the cultural public sphere, and a
discourse public forms around the values, media and citizens that underlie
both royals and riots in the popular imagination. Despite the ugliness, the
‘public sphere on the beach’ sometimes seems to be a better guide to
Australian politics than the better-dressed and better-behaved version in
Canberra. The public sphere is a better concept with the cultural added.
Notes
1. The Wikipedia entry ‘WTO Ministerial Conference of 1999’ gives a good
account of the protests, their organization, activity and aftermath (see358
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WTO_Meeting_of_1999 and http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Jose_Bove).
2. But see also http://abcnews.go.com/Primetime/story?id=1231684&page=1,
and a 2004 posting to the National Vanguard website (www.
nationalvanguard.org/printer.php?id=4330) where the ‘lovely and talented’
12-year-olds are interviewed:
Is there anything cuter than two identical twin twelve-year-old girls who
have a band together? How about if they dress in matching plaid skirts –
that ups the cuteness quotient, right? And what if they perform folky
versions of classic racist songs by bands like Skrewdriver and Rahowa?
Whoa! Now we are heading into the cute danger zone.
Asked about their name, the cuteness pales beside the racist intent. The
twins reply: ‘Part of our heritage is Prussian German. Also our eyes are
blue, and Prussian blue is just a really pretty color.’ There is also the
discussion of the lack of “Prussian blue” colouring (Zyklon B residue) in
the so-called gas chambers in the concentration camps. We think it might
make people question some of the inaccuracies of the “Holocaust” myth’.
3. The news media from which we quote in this article were not selected as a
social science sample; we make no claims for their representativeness or
statistical significance. The quotations have been chosen to illustrate a
particular discursive position or gambit, in order to exemplify the
formation of a discourse public.
4. Surf lifesavers in Australia are frequently volunteers, a fact the Daily
Telegraph’s editorial suggests that ‘we have all been taught to respect’, and
that ‘in this country we have bred a strain of selflessness so ennobling and
so constant [it] is something which every decent Australian regards as a
stamp of quality on our national character’ (Daily Telegraph, 2005).
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